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Over the past few years, there has been agradual stabilisation and downward trend inmost violent crimes, and murder in
particular (see the first article in this issue on crime
statistics). Although this is good news, the percentage
of people killed by firearms increased from 41% of
all murders in 1994 to 49% in 2000 (the last year for
which this information was released publicly).1
South Africa has high levels of both firearm related
crime and firearm ownership. In 1994 there were 
3.5 million firearms licensed to civilians.2 Licensed
firearm ownership has increased slightly over the last
10 years and civilians now own 3,547,406 firearms
while the police and the army have 567,000
firearms.3 This means that civilians have more than
six times as many firearms as those held by the state
security forces.4
Licensed guns that are lost and stolen contribute to
the pool of illegal firearms in South Africa. The
single biggest source of illegal firearms is loss and
theft from civilian owners.5 Annually 20,000 guns on
average are stolen from civilians, most of which are
handguns.6 In addition, between 1990 and 2002, an
estimated 16,893 police firearms were lost or stolen,
while 1,759 firearms were stolen from the South
African National Defence Force (SANDF). 
Amnesties as a tool for reducing firearms
Amnesties are most often held in order to reduce or
dispose of illegal firearms or in some instances,
superfluous guns. Amnesties by their nature imply
anonymity and exemption from prosecution. In
terms of section 138 of the new Firearms Control
Act (No. 60 of 2000) the term amnesty means an
“indemnity against prosecution for the unlawful
possession of a firearm or ammunition.”7
However, most amnesties impose conditions, such
as conducting ballistic testing on any firearm
handed in, which can result in prosecution if the
firearm is linked to a crime. Most governments
impose these conditions during an amnesty. In
some instances, however, such as in the case of
Brazil, blanket amnesties – in which no ballistic
testing is undertaken – are declared. 
Within the international community, firearm
amnesties are seen as one of the tools available to
governments to control both legal and illegal stocks
of guns, and have been used around the world for
this purpose. Sometimes known as voluntary
weapons collection programmes, amnesties also
provide an avenue for people to voluntarily hand in
guns. This may take the form of gun buy-back
schemes or exchange programmes. 
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GUNS UNDER FIRE
Initial results of the
2005 firearms amnesty
On 1 January 2005 government launched the largest ever firearms amnesty. By 31 March 50,233 firearms had
been surrendered. Due to public demand, the amnesty was extended to 30 June. This article assesses the
impact of the first three months of the amnesty. Although media coverage focused on the illegal weapons
handed in, the nearly 28,000 licensed guns surrendered represent just over one year’s supply of lost guns that
will now not enter the illegal market. And considering the widespread use of handguns in violent crime, the
removal of over 43,000 handguns from circulation represents a substantial victory.
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These programmes have been used in a wide range
of situations, including United Nations peace
operations in post-conflict countries such as Sierra
Leone and the Solomon Islands; inner cities and rural
towns in the United States; in Australia to collect
weapons that were banned under new legislation;
and in South Africa to complement the Firearms
Control Act (FCA).8
There are several key factors that contribute to the
success of an amnesty. These include their duration
and timing, conditions for amnesty, location of hand-
in points, communication and publicity, incentives,
and internal organisational planning and capacity.9 In
addition, the socio-political climate in which a
declaration of amnesty occurs is critical to its success
or failure. 
For example, one of the reasons that the amnesty
initiated by Gun Free South Africa in late 1994
yielded few firearms is that the public did not yet
sufficiently trust either the police or the new
democratic order and so were reluctant to hand in
their guns. The climate in 2005 is very different:
South Africa has just celebrated 10 years of
democracy with a growing confidence both locally
and internationally in the country’s future. In
addition, and more importantly for its success, the
2005 amnesty was declared during the first phase of
the implementation of the new FCA. 
Although the primary objective of most governments
in declaring amnesties is to remove illegal guns from
circulation, experience shows that amnesties have
the potential to achieve a number of objectives.
These can include raising public awareness and
creating a climate to assist in the implementation of
new firearms legislation, as well as providing an
opportunity for the voluntary surrender of licensed
guns that are no longer needed or wanted. These
impacts must not be underestimated.
Firearm amnesties in South Africa
Several amnesties, which included ammunition, have
been held over the past 10 years. The first national
amnesty was held sometime during the four years of
the negotiated settlement (1990-1994) over a period
of three days.10 The main purpose was to remove
excess weapons from a society that had engaged in a
low-intensity civil war for several decades. 
The only other national amnesty was the one
initiated by civil society through the gun free South
Africa campaign. This was a 24-hour amnesty held
on 16 December 1994. Although it yielded few
firearms, the amnesty’s most significant impact was
to put the issue of gun control on the political
agenda. This eventually resulted in the promulgation
of new and stricter firearms legislation (the FCA). 
When considered against the success factors noted
above, the impact of these amnesties was generally
limited by their short duration, poor
communication, and insufficient organisational
planning.
By contrast, the 2005 amnesty was part of a major
governmental drive to reduce and better manage
firearms in South Africa. One of the priorities of the
South African Police Service’s (SAPS) five-pillar
strategy for combating the proliferation of firearms is
to reduce and eradicate the illegal pool of guns and
criminal use of firearms.11 Operation Sethunya – the
largest ever police effort to stem the proliferation of
firearms – and other similar police interventions
have been one of the mechanisms for dealing with
illegal guns (see SA Crime Quarterly No 10). The
declaration of a firearm amnesty is another tool to
address the problem.
The amnesty issue had been on the political agenda
for several years. In 2004 discussions in the SAPS
and the Secretariat of Safety and Security led to the
conclusion that the time was right because the
firearms strategy adopted by government in 2000
was beginning to show results.12 Specifically, these
included police initiatives like Operation Sethunya
and its integration into day-to-day police activities;
the public destruction of recovered firearms, and the
implementation of the Firearms Control Act. 
These successes together with increased police
visibility, especially in dealing with firearm related
crimes, contributed to a climate conducive to
declaring an amnesty for the illegal possession of
firearms. Another factor was the increase in the
number of queries from the public on the surrender
of unwanted guns, both at the Central Firearms
Register (CFR) and police stations across the
country.13
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Aims of Amnesty 2005
The primary objective was to recover illegal firearms.
However, a second important objective – and one
which has received less media coverage – was to
provide firearm owners with the opportunity to hand
in unwanted licensed firearms.14
The declaration of the amnesty was intended to
complement the implementation of the FCA by
providing the public with an opportunity to hand in
weapons which under the new Act had become
illegal, or for those who had failed to comply under
the old Act (such as failure to register an inherited
firearm), or even for those who did not want to
renew their licence. 
In developing the strategy for the amnesty,
government identified several key elements for
success. One was the need to work closely with civil
society in order to secure public support, and the
other was to develop a comprehensive
communications and media strategy. 
Approval was granted by parliament in November
2004 for an amnesty limited to firearms, their parts
and components and ammunition. Any other offence
committed with firearms was not included and the
perpetrators of any such crimes would be prosecuted.
National communications strategy
The SAPS viewed communications as a priority and a
comprehensive strategy was developed at national
level, with emphasis on devolving authority and
initiative to provincial and station level. The aims of
the strategy were to:
• inform the public about the amnesty and 
encourage them to hand in firearms; and  
• inform the public about the FCA with a specific 
emphasis on responsible gun ownership and the
requirements of the new Act.
The strategy also had specific internal and external
components. Although most communications were
directed to the public, all police members had to
aware of the SAPS’ goals in declaring an amnesty,
and the need to reduce the circulation of firearms in
the country.15 To this end a leaflet explaining both the
purpose and the procedures for the amnesty and the
procedure for the voluntary handing in of firearms
was inserted into all 144,000 SAPS salary advice
envelopes.
Communicating with the public
The external communications strategy was
widespread, and used a multi-media approach to
meet its three objectives:
• informing the public about how to participate in 
the amnesty through distributing materials such
as pamphlets, newspaper adverts and inserts in
national newspapers;
• communicating with the public through a 
national call centre which operated on a 24-
hour basis and was able to give detailed
information on each specific case; and
• mobilising broad support for the amnesty and 
the vision of a safer South Africa, through radio
adverts as well as T-shirts, caps and posters.
In January 2005 a double-page insert was placed in
the TV magazine of both City Press and Rapport
newspapers. The insert combined information about
the amnesty with useful details about the new Act
with the hope of encouraging people to use the
amnesty to dispose of their illegal or unwanted
firearms. Other popular magazines such as
Huisgenoot and You were also used to distribute
similar information.
The SAPS also developed partnerships with key
corporate institutions such as SABC, Shoprite
Checkers and SA Pole Advertising, securing
sponsorship at the same time as getting maximum
coverage. Media coverage was most extensive on
radio, which included adverts as well as frequent
talk shows. Although the SABC was one of the main
channels of communication, local community radio
stations and independent stations were also used,
especially at provincial level. 
All three SABC TV stations were also used to
communicate the message – again through adverts,
talk shows and interviews. In the last week of the
amnesty, SABC TV 3 (Take 5) had a daily slot
focusing on issues related to the amnesty, ending
with the TV 1 Asikhulume talk show on the Sunday
after the 31 March closing date.
Products such as the T-shirts, caps, posters and
pamphlets were primarily aimed at promoting the
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Firearms Control Act. This was a deliberate strategy
to ensure that some of the key messages
communicated through the amnesty period – such as
responsible firearm ownership – could be sustained
after the amnesty, in support of the new legislation.
The national firearms call centre received between
500 and 1,000 calls a day, peaking in the last few
days before the 31 March deadline.
Provincial communication strategies
Although the communications strategy was
developed and managed at national level, provinces
could develop their own programmes based on their
particular needs and context. The provincial
strategies differed but were generally impressive. The
communications strategies from KwaZulu-Natal and
the Western Cape were the most comprehensive,16
which is encouraging considering that these two
provinces, together with Gauteng, have the highest
number of firearm related crimes.
A message shared across most of the provinces was
the creation of a safer country or province. For
example, one of the slogans in the Eastern Cape was
“Let’s make the Eastern Cape the safest province.”17
In some provinces, such as Mpumalanga, a greater
emphasis was placed on the amnesty process, with
the primary message ”you only have ninety (90) days
to surrender your unlawful firearm or ammunition
without prosecution.”18
Amnesty results
The weapons handed in during the amnesty have
been grouped into three categories:
• Illegal firearms: weapons or ammunition which 
under the new Act are deemed illegal that are
surrendered voluntarily. This can include guns
that have not been licensed, or firearms (licensed
or unlicensed) used to commit a crime.
• Voluntary hand-in: the handing in of any 
licensed firearm or ammunition permitted under
the licence.
• Confiscated: any firearm or ammunition 
confiscated by the SAPS during day-to-day police
activities and operations.
A total of 59,301 firearms, including firearm parts
and components, were handed in during the first
three months of the 2005 amnesty (Table 1). Given
the dual focus of the amnesty on both legal and
illegal firearms, it is not surprising that the largest
number of weapons (28,409) were in the ‘voluntary
hand-in’ category. Nevertheless, as many as 43%
(21,824) of all firearms and components collected
were illegal (Table 1). An additional 9,068 firearms
and components were confiscated during the same
period. 
If the figures for the amnesty are added to those of
the confiscated firearms, a total of 52% of firearms
retained by police between January and March 2005
can be described as ‘illegally possessed firearms’.
One aspect of the amnesty which has been
underplayed in the media reports is the significant
amount of ammunition handed in and confiscated,
amounting to more than one million rounds (Table 1). 
Most of the firearms surrendered were handguns
(pistols/revolvers), followed by rifles and shotguns
(Table 1). Given the widespread use of handguns in
violent crime in South Africa, this is one of the most
significant impacts of the amnesty: removing over
43,000 handguns from circulation.
The ISS was given permission to study a sample of
the applications received by the SAPS from people
surrendering a firearm. A total of 269 SAPS 522(a)
forms were reviewed, identifying province, make and
type of firearm, and reasons for handing in the gun.
The results show that the most likely reason (45%) for
turning in a gun was that it had belonged to a
deceased person (Table 2). 
Impact
The 2005 firearms amnesty has had a significant
impact at several levels:
• the removal of thousands of firearms  from 
circulation;
• increased public awareness about the need to 
rid society of guns;
• raised public awareness about the FCA; and
• improved police visibility.
Removing firearms from circulation
A substantial number of firearms were collected
during the amnesty – the largest number during any
amnesty effort in South Africa thus far. The number
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and types of guns handed in suggest that the first
three months of the amnesty have been a success.
Despite a focus on the high number of licensed guns
that have been handed in, it is precisely this type of
firearm that is most likely to be either lost or stolen:
owners who have an interest in possessing a firearm
will generally take care of it; those who are
disinterested are most at risk for loss and theft. 
The nearly 28,000 licensed guns handed in
voluntarily exceed the number of firearms stolen or
lost annually from licensed owners. This translates
into just over one year’s supply of lost guns that will
not enter the illegal market thanks to the amnesty.
This is a substantial victory. According to one
analyst, ”no matter what way you look at it, this
amnesty has been an unqualified success.”19 The
many firearms surrendered that fall into the
‘voluntary handing-in’ category demonstrates the
value of not focusing on illegal firearms only.
The tendency to focus almost exclusively on the
number of illegal firearms misses one of the central
purposes of an amnesty – its ability to create a
climate for all sorts of weapons to be handed in. This
is most evident in the number of legal firearms
surrendered, as well as the handing over of limpet
mines, grenades and other explosives and light
weapons that technically were not covered under
the amnesty declaration. 
Raising public awareness
The amnesty has created a climate in which
government is not only able to remove illegal guns
from circulation, but is also able to raise awareness
about the new Act and the need for gun owners to
comply with its provisions or face prosecution. In a
survey conducted by SaferAfrica among 400 South
Africans between the ages of 16–40 years, 90% of
Table 1: Firearms, parts and components surrendered under amnesty, by type  
Type Confiscated Surrendered by the public Total 
by police Illegal Voluntary hand-in   
Complete firearm 
Revolver/pistol 7,465 14,403 21,399 43,267  
Rifle 664 4,815 4,266 9,745  
Shotgun 519 2,205 2,231 4,955  
Auto/semi-automatic 92 35 35 162  
Homemade 211 34 14 259  
Total 8,951 21,492 27,945 58,388  
Firearm components 
Barrel 101 283 386 770  
Frame 7 35 66 108  
Receiver 9 14 12 35  
Total 117 332 464 913  
Total: firearms & components 9,068 21,824 28,409 59,301  
Ammunition 116,820 388,163 550,309 1,055,292  
Magazines 5,876 4,057 6,522 16,455  
Source: Central Firearms Registry
Table 2: Most common reasons for 
surrendering firearm*
Category Number %  
Belonged to deceased person 138 45  
Take advantage of amnesty 42 14  
No need or use for firearm 27 9  
Want to relicence firearm 23 8  
Want firearm destroyed 23 8  
*Respondents provided their own reason, with
some listing multiple reasons for surrender.
the sample had heard about the amnesty through
radio, TV, print media or the police.20 This shows a
high level of awareness.
The duration of the amnesty has also been a key
element in its success. All previous amnesties in
South Africa have been less than a week, the shortest
being 24 hours. This is insufficient time for people to
consider handing in weapons. The 2005 amnesty has
demonstrated the importance of having a lengthy
period in which guns can be handed in, as well as a
comprehensive communications strategy. 
The decision to extend the amnesty based on public
requests suggests that the original three-month time
frame may well have been too short. It could also be
seen as a sign of success, with the dramatic increase
in firearms handed in over the last 10 days of the
amnesty period indicating that people want to hand
in their guns and that there are still many firearms out
there that need to be collected.
Blanket vs. conditional amnesty 
Placing conditions on an amnesty such as ballistics
testing, which raises the fear of prosecution, will
automatically exclude certain people from
participating. This is a difficult choice for government
to make but blanket amnesties have had enormous
success in countries such as Brazil. The South African
government’s decision not to provide a blanket
amnesty was based on a legal review by the state law
advisers, as well as a concern that criminals might be
seen as ‘getting off the hook’ if weapons were not
tested. 
Conclusion
Amnesties remain a useful and effective tool to
remove illegal firearms from circulation and to create
a climate which builds support for a range of other
measures to control the flow of firearms. These can
include the regulation of civilian possession of
firearms, and day-to-day police operations aimed at
confiscating guns. The firearms amnesty should be
viewed as a success in South Africa and as one tool
to reduce the illicit proliferation of small arms and
inculcate a culture of responsible firearms ownership.  
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